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BEYOND THE TORTURE MEMOS: PERCEPTUAL FILTERS, CULTURAL 
COMMITMENTS, AND PARTISAN IDENTITY 
Cassandra Burke Robertson* 
Efforts to hold the torture memo authors professionally accountable for 
their advice will face two difficulties. First, it will likely be difficult to prove 
that the memos were written in bad faith. While legal scholars and other 
lawyers agree nearly universally that the memos represent bad legal advice, 
bad advice does not necessarily equate to bad-faith advice. The existence of 
perceptual filters and deep partisan identification may have shaped the 
lawyers' views of the situation in ways that appear unfathomable to outsid-
ers. Second, even if the Office of Professional Responsibility finds evidence 
of professional misconduct, there is a risk that efforts to hold the memo 
authors accountable will lack widespread political support, as onlookers 
view such efforts through their own perceptual frameworks and partisan 
commitments. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Who should face accountability for the mistreatment of prisoners in 
the war on terror? Five years ago, the scope of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib 
was first revealed; this year, the Justice Department admitted that a single 
suspect was waterboarded one hundred and eighty-three times. 1 Some at the 
bottom of the political hierarchy have already been convicted for their par-
ticipation in prisoner abuse. 2 Those closer to the top of the political hie-
rarchy also find their actions subject to scrutiny, as the Department of Jus-
tice's Office of Professional Responsibility is carrying out an investigation 
into the professional conduct of the lawyers who authored the memos per-
mitting "enhanced interrogation.''3 
Assistant Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Peter 
Burke, Thomas Robertson, Michael Scharf, Jan E. Stets, Robert Strassfeld, and the partici-
pants at the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center War Crimes Research Symposium on 
September II, 2009 for helpful discussion and feedback on tills project. 
I Scott Shane, Waterboarding Used 266 Times on 2 Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, April 19, 
2009, at AI. 
2 See David S. Cloud, Private Gets 3 Years for Iraq Prison Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2005, at A20. 
3 David Johnston & Scott Shane, Interrogation Memos: Inquiry Suggests No Charges, 
N.Y. TIMEs, May 6, 2009, at AI ("The report by the Office of Professional Responsibility, an 
internal ethics unit within the Justice Department, is also likely to ask state bar associations 
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This article argues that efforts to hold the memo authors professio-
nally accountable for their advice will face two difficulties. First, it will 
likely be difficult to prove that the memos were written in bad faith. While 
legal scholars and other lawyers agree nearly universally that the memos 
represent bad legal advice, bad advice does not necessarily equate to bad-
faith advice. The existence of perceptual filters and deep partisan identifica-
tion may have shaped the lawyers' views of the situation in ways that ap-
pear unfathomable to outsiders. 4 Second, even if the Office of Professional 
Responsibility fmds evidence of professional misconduct, there is a risk that 
efforts to hold the memo authors accountable will lack widespread support, 
as those efforts may be viewed by partisan opponents as lacking political 
legitirnacy.5 Onlookers will also view such efforts through their own per-
ceptual frameworks and partisan commitments, and may therefore not agree 
that the memo authors' conduct deserves to be punished. In particular, this 
article argues that between 2005 and 2009 there was a redefinition of cul-
tural commitments associated with partisan identity. In 2004 there was still 
a broad anti-torture American identity, but that identity became fragmented 
by 2008, with support for torture breaking along partisan lines. In time, cul-
tural commitments may again shift to allow a united American identity that 
condemns torture. Until that happens, however, it is likely that accountabili-
ty efforts will further entrench partisan animosity. 
II. THE TORTURE MEMOS 
The conventional narrative of the torture memos is that they 
represent the worst sort of venality-that the lawyers in the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) were willing to sacrifice professional ideals of indepen-
dence in favor of providing legal cover to blatantly illegal acts that the Bush 
administration wished to undertake. 6 Legal complaints center around two 
areas: the weak legal analysis of the Y oo/Bybee memo that was later with-
to consider possible disciplinary action, which could include reprimands or even disbarment, 
for some of the lawyers involved in writing the legal opinions, the officials said."). 
4 See infra Part III. 
See infra Part IV. 
See Posting of Brian Tamanaha to Balkinization Blog, Reasons to Infer That the OLC 
Torture Memos Were Not Issued in "Good Faith", http:/lbalkin.blogspot.com./2009/04/how-
we-k:now-that-olc-torture-memos-were.html (Apr. 22 2009 12:51); Jordan J. Paust, Executive 
Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interroga-
tion of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005). See also Jesselyn Radack, Tor-
tured Legal Ethics: The Role of the Government Advisor in the War on Terrorism, 77 U. 
Cow. L. REv. l (2006); Stephen Gillers, Tortured Reasoning, AM. LAW., July 1, 2004; Julie 
Angell, Comment, Ethics, Torture, and Marginal Memoranda at the DOJ Office of Legal 
Counsel, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 557 (2005); Marisa Lopez, Note, Professional Responsi-
bility: Tortured Independence in the Office of Legal Counsel, 57 FLA. L. REv. 685 (2005). 
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drawn, and the lack of factual support for other memos authorizing specific 
techniques. Moral complaints suggest that the lawyers were complicit in a 
policy oftorture and abuse. 7 
There is little debate that the withdrawn memo's legal analysis is 
extraordinarily weak-its analysis was "widely regarded as preposterous,"8 
even spectacularly bizarre.9 The memo was criticized for defming torture 
"by lifting language from a Medicare statute on medical emergencies," "ig-
nor[ing] inconvenient Supreme Court precedents," and "flatly misrepre-
sent[ing] what sources said."10 It was described as "almost a parody oftex-
tualism, in which words alone are considered, having no regard for the con-
text of their usage."IJ Because the analysis was so bad, many assumed that 
the memo was written in bad faith: "One of these expectations is that the 
law will be interpreted in good faith, with an eye toward recovering the 
substantive meaning of a statute, treaty, or line of cases. Violating this ex-
pectation is the essence of the unethical conduct of lawyers like Yoo and 
Bybee." 12 
Other memos, which gave a more detailed authorization of specific 
interrogation techniques, were criticized for their lack of factual support 
rather than deficiencies in legal analysis. 13 In one case, the CIA had asked 
for an opinion as to whether specific interrogation practices such as sleep 
deprivation, waterboarding, stress positions, and related techniques could be 
legally undertaken. 14 The OLC agreed on the legal standard: the techniques 
were impermissible if they were "specifically intended to inflict severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering .... " 15 The OLC did not analyze 
See, e.g., David Swanson, Torture Probe: Who's Being Protected Under the Searing 
Bright Light?, HUMANIST, July-August 2009, available at http://www.thehumanist.org/ 
humanist/09 _jul_ aug/Swanson.html. 
8 David Luban, Torture and the Professions, 26 CRJM. JUST. Ennes 2, 58-59 (2007). 
See DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL Ennes AND HUMAN DIGNITY 159, 177-79 (2007). See also 
W. Bradley Wendel, Executive Branch Lawyers in a Time of Terror: 2008 F. W. Wickwire 
Memorial Lecture, 31 DALHOUSIE L.J. 24 7, 265 (2008) ("In this case, the arguments relied 
upon by the Bush administration lawyers are so far outside the range of reasonable that it is 
impossible to take them seriously. That is the basis for concluding that these lawyers acted 
unethically."). 
10 Luban, supra note 8, at 59. 
11 W. Bradley Wendel, Deference to Clients and Obedience to Law: The Ethics of the 
Torture Lawyers (A Response To Professor Hatfield), 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 58, 69 
(2009). 
12 Jd. at 70. 
13 See Tamanaha, supra note 6. 
14 Jd. 
15 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). See generally Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General 
Counsel (May 10, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/techniques.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2009) [hereinafter Bradbury Memo]. 
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whether such techniques would be reasonably viewed as inflicting such 
pain. Instead, as critics point out, the OLC memos defer to the CIA's assur-
ance that their use of such techniques was not intended to cause severe pain 
or suffering. The memo accepted as a factual predicate that detainees would 
be "evaluated by medical and psychological professionals" who would en-
sure that "the detainee's physical condition [was] such that these interven-
tions would not have lasting effect, and his psychological state [was] strong 
enough that no severe psychological harm would result." 16 Once that factual 
predicate was accepted, it was a short step to the legal conclusion that the 
techniques were not specifically intended to cause severe pain or suffering. 
The memos did not analyze whether outsiders would view such assurances 
as reasonable in light of what was known about the effects of such 
techniques. 
Professor Brian Tamanaha finds this factual acceptance to violate 
the lawyer's duty, concluding that the OLC: 
[I]ssued a legal opinion sanctioning the legality of these interrogation 
practices based entirely upon the promise of the potential criminal suspects 
that they would not violate the law when engaging in these practices .... 
[T]here was no independent or reliable factual basis to support the legal 
opinion. Without such a factual basis, the legal opinion simply could not 
be issued in good faith. 17 
III. PERCEPTUAL FILTERS 
But does either bad legal analysis or reliance on self-serving factual 
assumptions necessarily equate to bad-faith legal practice? In a recent ar-
ticle, 18 I argued that cognitive bias and associated blind spots may better 
explain such lapses. Both the unsupported legal claims of the Yoo/Bybee 
memo and the reliance of the "techniques memo" on the CIA's own self-
serving assessment seem to fit in with classic bias blind spot research. 19 If 
the memo authors were trying to provide legal cover for a pre-ordained re-
sult, they did a very bad job of it-if the lawyers truly acted in bad faith, 
why would they not manufacture the appearance of more reliable data, ra-
ther than openly relying on self-serving assessments? It seems more likely 
that the authors were simply blind to how the rest of the world would view 
their analysis, and that they never thought to question the accuracy or relia-
16 Bradbury Memo, supra note 15, at 6. 
17 Tamanaha, supra note 6. 
18 See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CoNN. L. 
REv. 1 (2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=l002& 
context=cassandra robertson. 
19 ld. 
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bility of the CIA's assessment. If they saw no reason to question the accura-
cy of the CIA's assurances, they would not expect others to do so either. 
Social scientists have long known that people interpret facts and 
events in ways that conform to their prior expectations and allegiances. In 
1954, a study of a Princeton-Dartmouth football game revealed that Prince-
ton and Dartmouth fans viewed the game very differently. 20 Princeton fans 
were more likely to notice Dartmouth rule infractions, and vice versa. Fans 
were also likely to interpret those rule violations differently, believing that 
the other team's infractions were more likely to have been intentional than 
those of their own team. These differences in attention and interpretation 
have been referred to as a "perceptual filter." 21 
Perceptual filters also exist in the political realm. A study of Bos-
nian Serb, Muslim, and neutral observers showed that each group viewed 
media coverage of the 1994 Sarajevo market bombing very differently and 
formed different conclusions about who was responsible for the bombing. 22 
Other studies showed similar effects in U.S. Presidential election coverage23 
and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. 24 These differences are more than simply 
differences of opinion-they are unconscious differences in perception, 
unknown to the individuals involved, that cause individuals to differ both in 
their perception of factual matters and their interpretation of those facts. 25 
Such perceptual filters were almost certainly at work in the Office 
of Legal Counsel. 26 Under the Bush administration, hiring was highly parti-
20 See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). 
21 See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. 
L.REv.lOl, 108 (1997). 
22 See Kimberly Matheson & Sanela Dursun, Social Identity Precursors to the Hostile 
Media Phenomenon: Partisan Perceptions of Coverage of the Bosnian Conflict; 4 GROUP 
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 116, 123 (200 1 ). 
23 See Russell J. Dalton et a!., Partisan Cues and the Media: Information Flows in the 
1992 Presidential Election, 92 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. Ill (1998). 
24 See R.P. Vallone eta!., The Hostile Media Phenomenon: Biased Perception and Per-
ceptions of Media Bias in Coverage of the Beirut Massacre, 49 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 577 {1985). 
25 For example, when one Dartmouth alumnus was unable to perceive the same infractions 
that the. Princeton alumni had told him about, he assumed that he had not been given the 
whole film-it never occurred to him that be simply viewed the game differently than the 
Princeton group. He sent the following telegram to the researchers: "Preview of Princeton 
movies indicates considerable cutting of important part please wire explanation and possibly 
air mail missing part before showing scheduled for January 25[.] [W]e have splicing equip-
ment." Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 20, at 132. 
26 Such perceptual filters also affect moral judgment through "ethical fading," which is 
defmed as the "tendency to interpret the situation so that it does not implicate one's ethical or 
,, 
lr·r 
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san. 
27 John Yoo, like many others in the administration, defmed himself as a 
partisan Republican who was keenly interested in the political success of his 
party. 28 This shared mindset likely made Yoo and others subject to the same 
perceptual filters of the administration they served. A political opponent-
or even a neutral observer-would thus be more likely to see the weak-
nesses in the factual assumptions and legal analysis the memos contained. A 
political sympathizer would be less likely to see those weaknesses, and 
would therefore be more likely to give legal advice that the administration 
viewed favorably, even without any deliberate attempt to subvert the law. 
Thus, the perceptual filters created a type of "echo chamber" where dissent-
ing views were not just unaired, but were actually unseen and unknown. 
IV. TORTURE AND POLITICAL IDENTITY 
Perceptual filters cannot be cast aside easily; instead, they are deep-
ly embedded in individuals' identities. As noted in the prior section, sharing 
commitments with others makes it more likely that perceptual filters will 
also be shared: "[p ]eople who share formative identities tend to apprehend 
facts in a similar way in part because they are likely to be drawing on com-
mon life experiences when interpreting what various events signify."29 
These perceptual frameworks are not random. Rather, people "face strong 
psychological pressure to fit their perceptions of how the world does work 
to their shared appraisals of how the world should work" in order to avoid 
dissonance and to protect their status within groups whose members share 
their core values. 30 
Thus, a person's political identity will affect not just his or her opi-
nions about relevant policy choices: it will also affect his or her perception 
of the facts underlying those policy choices. 31 In social psychology terms, 
moral duties." Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons 
from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRAL. REv. 451,470 (2007). 
27 See, e.g., Editorial, Contradiction: Washington Contrast, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (WV), 
Apr. 9, 2009, available at http:/lwvgazette.com/Opinion/Editorials/200904090956. 
28 See generally JOHN Yoo, WAR BY OTHER MEANs: AN INSIDER's AccoUNT OF THE WAR 
ON TERROR (2006). 
29 Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in 
'Acquaintance Rape' Cases 3 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 196), available 
at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id= 143 7742. 
3o Id 
31 Dan M. Kahan et a!., Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-
Male Effect in Risk Perception, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 465 (2007) ("[I]ndividuals tend 
to conform their view of the risks of putatively dangerous activities--commerce and tech-
nology, guns, abortion-to their cultUral evaluations of them. Because individuals' identities 
are threatened when they encounter information that challenges beliefs commonly held with-
in their group ... , the result is political conflict over risk regulation among groups commit-
ted to opposing hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and communitarian 
2009] BEYOND THE TORTURE MEMOS 395 
people's identities consist of various roles and group memberships, each of 
which has shared cultural and social meanings-thus, a person may be a 
lawyer (a role identity), parent (another role identity), Republican (a group 
identity), and an American (another group identity). When another's evalua-
tion of oneself is consistent with one's own self-conception, "self-
verification" is achieved.32 When another's appraisal is at odds with one's 
own self-view, emotional distress will result. A person will either change 
his or her behavior in order to obtain feedback from others that facilitates 
self-verification, or the individual will adopt cognitive strategies to cope 
with the inconsistency, such as selectively focusing on information that ap-
pears to confirm one's own self-view. 33 
A role identity and group identity are related by having meanings 
that are held in cornrnon. 34 For example, the meaning ofbeing a member of 
the Republican party and a lawyer within the Republican administration 
involved sharing the common meaning of "fighting terrorism." Administra-
tion lawyers verified this meaning in their identity by authorizing so-called 
"enhanced interrogation"-but to do so, they unconsciously filtered contra-
dictory legal authority forbidding torture. Authorizing such techniques si-
multaneously verified their membership in the Republican party, as the ac-
tion approved of techniques desired by administration leaders. 
Essentially, the role and group identities and the meanings held 
within these identities (of the acceptability of tmiure in the fight against 
terrorism) shaped the memo authors' perception and legal advice. This is 
not unusual: a lawyer may often provide a client with a desired answer not 
out of any conscious desire to bend the law in favor of the client, but rather 
out of an unconscious filtering of information that causes the lawyer to fo-
cus more intently on favorable precedent while contrary authority goes un-
noticed. Filtering is especially likely when the lawyer is a "true believer" in 
the client's cause, as John Yoo was; in such cases, both lawyer and client 
are apt to overlook non-conforming feedback. 35 Thus, a lawyer might pro-
vide the answers the client desires not because of pressure or venality, but 
worldviews."). See also Sheldon Stryker and Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of 
Identity Theory, 63 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 286 (2000). 
32 Jan E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, Identity The01y and Social Identity Theory, 63 Soc. 
PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225 (2000) ("In identity theory, the core of an identity is the categorization 
of the self as an occupant of a role, and the incorporation, into the self, of the meanings and 
expectations associated with that role and its performance."). 
33 See Jan E. Stets & Alicia D. Cast, Resources and Identity Verification from an Identity 
Theo1y Perspective, 50 SOCIOLOGICAL PERSP. 517, 522 (2007); William B. Swann, Jr., The 
Trouble With Change: Self-Verification and Allegiance to the Self, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 177, 178 
(1997). 
34 
Stets & Burke, supra note 32, at 228. 
35 
See Robertson, supra note 18. 
J:J 
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simply because of a limited perception of the facts. Public condemnation is 
unlikely to change such behavior-approval from clients and other res-
pected individuals would verify the lawyer's self-conceptions, emotionally 
vindicating the lawyer's actions even in the face of public disapproval. 
The advice proffered by the memo authors was not-and could not 
be--independent of allegiance to the groups in which they belonged. 36 Giv-
en this connection, the torture memos may have been much more a product 
of one playing out a role (here, the lawyer) in a group (of the Republican 
party) and engaging in perceptual filtering. This filtering process happens 
unconsciously; unlike a calculated response to venality or outside pressure, 
it may occur without any conscious awareness by the lawyer. Nevertheless, 
the lawyers' advice simultaneously served both their role and group identi-
ty. By filtering out countervailing legal interpretations, the lawyers were 
able to maintain a view of themselves as providing independent and compe-
tent advice. By offering advice that comported with the administration's 
goals, they were able to verify the meaning of the Republican party-the 
acceptability of torture. 
But the problem of torture and political identity affected much more 
than the lawyers: it also shaped the policy commitments of the American 
public. Here, two group identities overlapped: an American identity that 
condemned torture, and a Republican group identity that grew to support it. 
As noted, people tend to view the world in a self-serving manner, allowing 
them to protect their self-conceptions. Thus, when information about possi-
ble torture first entered the national consciousness after the Abu Ghraib 
photographs were released, the initial American reaction was largely one of 
denial. 37 While the media in other countries was more likely to characterize 
the abuse as systemic and reflective of larger U.S. policy decisions, the 
American media was more likely to characterize it as the result of the im-
moral activities of a few "hillbilly kids," unrelated to larger policy objec-
tives. 38 The American identity condemned torture; therefore, when pre-
sented with activities that looked very much like torture, Americans viewed 
36 Stets & Burke, supra note 32, at 228 ("(O]ne always and simultaneously occupies a role 
and belongs to a group, so that role identities and social identities are always and simulta-
neously relevant to, and influential on, perceptions, affect, and behavior."). 
37 See Timothy M. Jones & Penelope Sheets, Torture in the Eye of the Beholder: Social 
Identity, News Coverage, and Abu Ghraib, 16 PoL.COMM. 278 (2009). 
38 Robert N. Strassfeld, American Innocence, 37 CASE W. REs. J. INr'L L. 277, 305 (2006) 
(noting that the focus on Charles Graner and Lynndie England reinforces the idea that "the 
events at Abu Ghraib were aberrational and do not represent America" by portraying the 
events as "the sadistic diversion of 'trailer trash."'). By focusing on England and Graner, 
Americans could view the abuse without threat to their own identities: "Though the Ameri-
can faces in the Abu Ghraib pictures may look like ours, the representation of Graner and 
England allows many Americans to use class, geography, lifestyle, and education to distance 
themselves from torture and abuse." Id 
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those actions as unusual, unauthorized, and essentially unrepresentative of 
American policy. 39 
What is even more troubling than such biased perception of torture, 
however, is how the cultural meaning of torture and abuse changed over the 
course of time. Initially, the American identity condemned a policy of tor-
ture-if it had not, there would have been no reason for Americans to perce-
ive the information from Abu Ghraib as mere isolated abuse, even in the 
face of evidence suggesting otherwise. 40 But certain administration officials 
publicly stated a desire to change that identity to one more accepting of 
harsh tactics. Former Vice President Richard B. Cheney sent this message 
less than a week after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, arguing that a national 
identity that highly valued anti-torture policies might be ineffective to com-
bat national threats: "We also have to work through sort of the dark side, if 
you will .... It is a mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, and we 
have to operate in that arena."41 
Cheney's message did not succeed because it was inherently persu-
asive; rather, it did so because it was effective in changing the social mean-
ing of what it meant to be a Bush/Cheney Republican; Certainly, he sent a 
message that we needed to torture to get information. The factual back-
ground to back up that assertion, however, was largely absent.42 What lin-
guistics expert Deborah Tannen refers to as the "metamessage" in this case 
was much more important than the message itself. She distinguishes be-
tween message and metamessage by pointing out that "[i]nformation con-
veyed by the meanings of words is the message," but "[w]hat is communi-
cated about relationships-attitudes towards each other, the occasion, and 
what we are saying-is the metamessage. And it's metamessages that we 
39 Jones & Sheets, supra note 37, at 290 (concluding that "a shared social identity in the 
service of a positive national self-image ... unites journalists and citizenry in interpreting 
these events in nation-affirming ways."). 
40 Id. (noting that "declassified official memos suggest that at least some of what took 
place may have been official policy."). 
41 CHRJSTOPHER H. PYLE, GETTING AWAY WITH TORTURE: SECRET GOVERNMENT, WAR 
CRIMEs, AND THE RULE OF LAW 5 (2009). 
42 See Psychological Torture, CIA-Style, HARPER'S, Apr. 1997, at 23-24 ("Intense pain is 
quite likely to produce false confessions, fabricated to avoid additional punishment. This 
results in a time-consuming delay while an investigation is conducted and the adnllssions are 
proven untrue."). See also Hearing on Standards of Military Commissions and Tribunals 
Before the House Armed Services.Comm. (July 26, 2006) (prepared statement of Michael P. 
Scharf, Professor of Law and Director of the International Law Center at Case Western Re-
serve University School of Law), available at http:www.publicinternationallaw. 
org/publications/testimony (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (criticizing the testimony of Steven 
Bradbury, acting Assistant Attorney General and head of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, 
who authored the "techniques" memo of May 10); Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance: 
When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 129 
(2008). 
·h: 
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react to most strongly. "43 Here, the metamessage behind Cheney's stated 
message was that this is who we are-that Americans, or at least those who 
support his party, are willing, even eager to get their hands dirty, to work on 
the "dark side." 
Thus, Cheney was changing the cultural meaning of what it meant 
to be a Bush/Cheney Republican. Those who had made the cultural com-
mitment to support the Bush/Cheney agenda more broadly were therefore 
likely to accept a policy "doing whatever is necessary" and believing that 
such "enhanced interrogations" were indeed necessary to combat terrorist 
attacks. Such acceptance is consistent with recent research regarding cultur-
al commitments, which suggests that people accept or reject new informa-
tion based on the commitments they have already accepted. 44 When people 
had committed to the Bush/Cheney agenda, they were more likely to accept 
this shift in commitment to "work through ... the dark side. "45 
This shift in cultural meaning did not require people to define them-
selves in ways that were alien to their self-view, but instead built on pre-
existing components of the American identity. As other scholars have 
pointed out, the American identity has more than one aspect: on the one 
hand, it includes "freedom as a universal ideal" (and a view of the U.S. as 
'"the patron' for a free global environment"), but it also includes a "focus 
on strength [and] will" which carries a sense that appearing weak "would 
excite not the desired respect, but only contempt. "46 Thus, the American 
identity includes a cultural meaning of respect for human rights (as part of 
its emphasis on freedom) and includes a cultural meaning of global authori-
ty, which requires the appearance of strength. When American strength ap-
peared to be challenged by the events of 9/11, some have suggested that 
detainee abuse was a way of re-establishing the perceived strength of Amer-
ican power: "[f]rom this angle, the demonstration of US power through ab-
using detainees disciplines the world into a US global order .... "47 Thus, 
accepting "enhanced interrogation" or torture required people to emphasize 
the "authority" component of the American identity and de-emphasize the 
"human rights" component, but it did not require wholesale change. 
43 DEBORAH TANNEN, THAT'S NOT WHAT I MEANT: How CONVERSATIONAL STYLE MAKES 
OR BREAKS YOUR RELATIONS WITH OTHERS 29 ( 1992). 
44 Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & 
POL'YREV. 149, 151 (2006). 
45 PYLE, supra note 41. 
46 Brent J. Steele, 'Ideals that Were Really Never in Our Possession': Torture, Honor, and 
US Identity, 22 lNT'L REL. 243, 248 (2008), available at http://ire.sagepub.com/cgil 
reprintl22/2/243.pdf (quoting Jutta Weldes, The Cultural Production of Crises: U.S. Identity 
and Missiles in Cuba, in CULTURES OF INSECURITY: STATES, COMMUNITIES AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF DANGER46 (J. Weldes et al. eds. 1992)). 
47 Steele, supra note 46, at 251. 
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The strategy of re-defining partisan cultural commitment to include 
a willingness to engage in "enhanced interrogation" worked stunningly 
well. Between 2005 and 2009-a period of time well after the 9/11 at-
tacks-the percentage of Americans who "believed torture was at least 
sometimes justifiable" rose from thirty-eight percent to fifty-two percent. 48 
Among Republicans as a whole, it was more than sixty-six percent. 49 
Among Democrats, however, the percentage was much smaller-
approximately thirty-three percent. 50 Interestingly, sixty-two percent of 
white, Protestant evangelical Christians agreed that torture could be justi-
fied, while only forty percent of the nonreligious agreed. 51 It seems unlikely 
that this disparity could be explained as a matter of religious doctrine; more 
likely, it is an example of the type of cultural commitment described above. 
Evangelical Christians were more likely to support the Bush/Cheney ticket 
based on its social conservatism. When the cultural meaning ascribed to that 
ticket expanded to include support for torture, those who had already com-
mitted their support to the ticket also committed to support their views on 
torture. 52 
By the time of the Republican primaries for the 2008 presidential 
election, other Republican candidates also reflected this view. In a South 
Carolina debate, all Republican presidential hopefuls but one "endors[ ed] 
the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding, to 
uncover the proverbial ticking bomb" to "strong audience applause."53 Only 
John McCain objected to a re-definition of the American identity to include 
torture, stating that his experience in Vietnam had convinced him that "[i]t's 
not about the terrorists; it's about us. It's about what kind of country we 
are."54 McCain's message was one that the audience was not ready to hear, 
and audience members reacted with silence. 55 
48 Sanctioning of Torture by Americans Betrays All We Stand for, BEAVER COUNTY TIMES 
(Pa.), June 11, 2009. 
49 Id. 
5o Id. 
51 Torture, Religion Should Not Go Hand-In-Hand, YoRK DISPATCH (Pa.), June 10,2009. 
52 In the fall of 2009, t-shirts reading "I'd rather be waterboarding" were offered for sale 
by Conservative T-Shirts.com, alongside other shirts stating "Proud Republican," "Jesus 
Christ is a Personal Friend of Mine," and "Annoy a Liberal: Work Hard and Live Free." See 
http://www.conservative-t-shirts.com/conservative-t-shirts/waterboarding-t-shirts.html (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
53 
PYLE, supra note 41, at 152. 
s4 Id. 
55 
I d. Of course, McCain did win the Republican nomination. His victory in the primary 
may suggest either that his position on torture was less important than other considerations, 
or that the Republican voting public has a different position on torture than the audience, 
who may have represented only the base of the party. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
Because torture itself has entered the partisan divide, any investiga-
tion into torture policies will necessarily be subject to partisan perceptual 
frameworks as well. For an investigation to be successful, it would need to 
begin with an understanding of what is legal and conclude with an agree-
ment about what actually happened. Unfortunately, both of those goals are 
unlikely to be achieved. Due to the partisan divide that has been created 
over the torture issue, as well as the differing perceptual frameworks, it is 
unlikely that people will agree either on the legal question or the factual 
one. 
Furthermore, both sides question the motivations of the other. 
Those who were involved in developing the interrogation policies believe 
they are being unfairly targeted in a partisan witch-hunt. John Yoo, for ex-
ample, has characterized the Office of Professional Responsibility's investi-
gation into the torture memos as "a short-term political maneuver in re-
sponse to political criticism."56 Similarly, Cheney has stated that he believes 
the Obama administration's proposed investigation is "intensely partisan"-
that instead of appreciating the prior administration's effort.s to kyep the 
country safe, the new administration is "out there now threatening to disbar 
the lawyers who gave us the legal opinions. "57 On the other side, members 
of the Center for Constitutional Rights argue that the memo authors them-
selves were the ones who manipulated the law for partisan ends: 
Responsibility for the torture program cannot be laid at the feet of a few 
low-level operatives. Some agents in the field may have gone further than 
the limits so ghoulishly laid out by the lawyers who twisted the law to 
create legal cover for the program, but it is the lawyers and the officials 
who oversaw and approved the program who must be investigated. 58 
Thus, any investigation undertaken by the current administration 
will likely be viewed as legitimate only by those who already supported the 
administration. Like the Serbs and Muslims reacting to the Sarajevo bomb-
ing, or even like the Princeton and Dartmouth fans watching a game, each 
side is predisposed to focus on the faults of the other. Each side is also pre-
56 Yoo, supra note 28, at 183. 
57 Sam Stein, Cheney Accuses Obama of Launching "'ntensely Partisan" Torture Investi-
gation, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/08/30/ 
cheney-accuses-obama-of-1_ n_ 2 72160 .html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009) (quoting Dick Cheney 
from a Fox News interview). 
58 Holder-And Obama-Must Focus on Torture Accountability, CAPITAL TIMES (Wi.), 
August 27, 2009, available at http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinionleditoriallarticle_ 
a428f29c-lc0e-54e7 -b 178-873fe3b00e48.html. 
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disposed to impugn the motives of the other. These are not calculated views; 
they operate at a deeply unconscious level. 59 
Furthermore, studies show that even when individuals attempt to 
look beyond their own partisan biases, they are unable to; those biases are 
buried so deeply in the unconscious that they cannot be called up at will. 60 
Attempts to overcome unconscious partisan biases may even backfire, as 
asking people to focus on potential partisan biases can reinforce prior posi-
tions. 61 When people put additional time and effort into thinking about the 
conflict, they don't change the outcome; they believe they are "already be-
ing fair." 62 Thus, they simply put the extra time and effort into "supporting 
the position they already favored, not on rethinking the position they disa-
greed with. " 63 
The unconscious nature of such partisan commitments is especially 
troubling for accountability efforts. It may be that the partisan commitment 
to torture is currently weaker than other partisan commitments; people may 
express support for torture because political leaders they agreed with have 
expressed such support, and they are willing to accept it because it comports 
.with the "authority" aspect of their political identity. That commitment may 
not yet be deeply entrenched; it may be set aside if Republican political 
leaders express no support for torture as a component of partisan identity. 
But that commitment may also be further solidified if prosecutions or pro-
fessional sanctions indeed take place. What was a temporary emphasis on 
"authority" over "respect for human rights" might become a more perma-
nent part of partisan identification if, over the next few years, people are 
asked to reflect on those choices and thereby reinforce their acceptance of 
torture and detainee abuse. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given the entrenched divide, is it possible to move forward with a 
process to seek accountability? Perhaps. Some have suggested that prosecu-
tions are important for restoring the national anti-torture identity; that such 
accountability is not about the individuals themselves, but would instead 
59 See Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naive Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in 
Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L.J. 499, 518-19 (2008) ("Because we perceive ourselves to be 
objective, we have little reason to think critically about whether our beliefs are, in fact, cor-
rect .... [O]ur biased theories, beliefs, and expectations, tend to persevere."). 
60 
See Cynthia McPerson Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling 
Block to Seeing Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 157, 161 (2006). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 166. 
63 ld. 
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provide a "social statement" that these actions will not be tolerated. 64 What 
is not clear, however, is whether the partisan divide on torture has become 
too great to quickly re-create a national identity that condemns such acts. 65 
One possible way to move forward is through a truly bipartisan 
commission. If indeed the two parties can come together to agree on the 
interrogation techniques legally authorized under U.S. law, the techniques 
actually used, and who should be held responsible, such a "social statement" 
may be possible. Even if the parties disagree about the ultimate limits of 
torture, they may be able to find some common ground in the middle to 
condemn at least the most extreme cases. This is a difficult proposition, 
however: given the current breakdown on partisan lines, it will not be easy 
to get Republican involvement in such an investigation. And if a bipartisan 
commission can be created, there is also a risk that the final fmdings will 
break down on partisan lines, thus further entrenching the current divide 
over torture. 66 
In the end, it may simply be that more time is needed to change the 
cultural meanings associated with partisan identity. If a diminished military 
presence allows torture to fade into the background, it will become a less 
salient aspect of political culture. Conversely, an anti-torture meaning might 
begin to grow out of other sources of shared identities such as religious in-
stitutions: human rights advocates have suggested that a uniform religious 
response condemning torture from "the country's churches, synagogues, 
and mosques" might create a stronger religious identity condemning tor-
ture. 67 With enough time and distance, the cultural meaning may again shift 
to allow a united American identity that condemns torture. Until that time, 
64 Video: Marieke Wierda, Prosecuting Abuses Resulting From U.S. Counter-terror Poli-
cy, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qGzA _ X5b04 (last visited Nov. 4, 2009). 
65 In the long run, successful prosecutions might indeed help restore a national consensus. 
As other scholars have noted, court decisions themselves can play a role in conferring politi-
cal legitimacy. See, e.g., Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy, in THE 
DEMOCRACY SOURCEBOOK 251 (Robert A. Dahl et al. eds., 2003) ("(A)t its best the Court 
operates to confer legitimacy, not simply on the particular and parochial policies of the do-
minant political alliance, but upon the basic patterns of behavior required for the operation of 
a democracy."). However, such influence takes time to permeate society, and, in any case, 
requires a favorable court decision that withstands appeal to the Supreme Court. 
66 While avoiding accountability efforts may avoid entrenching the partisan divide over 
torture, it also risks creating a moral hazard problem: someone seeking to evade prosecution 
may deliberately stoke the fires of partisanship in order to ensure that the prosecution would 
be viewed as politically illegitimate. The more politically powerful the individual, the more 
likely that such strategies would be successful. Whether the harm caused by a wrongdoer 
avoiding justice weighs more than the harm resulting from partisan entrenchment is a politi-
cal, legal, and moral question that must be examined in each case. 
67 SHADI MOKHTARI, AFTER ABU GHRAIB: EXPLORING HUMAN RIGHTS IN AMERICAN AND 
THE MIDDLE EAST 209 (2009). 
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however, it is likely that accountability efforts will further entrench partisan 
animosity. 
